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Truth and Healing a 
Veteran’s Depression
Mike W. Martin
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Christopher Bailey
In “A Painful Lack of Wounds,” Dr. Chris-topher Bailey portrays an American veteran, Colin, who slips into a “serious but not severe” 
depression upon returning from the Iraq War. Af-
ter ruling out post-traumatic stress disorder, the 
psychiatrist comes to believe that Colin’s depres-
sion is tied to his feelings of being a wimp, of not 
having “done his part or proven his manhood,” 
and of losing his chance to become a hero because 
he had been assigned non-combat duty—feelings 
that the psychiatrist glosses (misleadingly?) as a 
“painful lack of wounds.” (I speak of the “the psy-
chiatrist,” rather than Dr. Bailey, in case some de-
tails of the case are constructed.) The psychiatrist 
links Colin’s feelings of failure with insecurities 
about his masculinity and about being able to de-
fend himself and his family. Invoking evolutionary 
psychology, the psychiatrist suggests to Colin that 
his depression may be linked to how our culture 
continually activates “visceral alarm systems” that 
evolved on the African savannah, while providing 
insufficient outlet for their expression—a dynamic 
that might be especially damaging to the mental 
health of white men like Colin and himself. In 
response to Colin’s questions, the psychiatrist af-
firms the martial arts while emphasizing prudence 
in expressing aggression.
I have four sets of questions and comments. 
First, does the psychotherapy succeed? We are 
told Colin is receptive to undertaking a course 
of talk therapy, but we are not told whether the 
therapy lifts the depression and has additional 
benefits. This information will color what we say 
about the psychiatrist’s diagnosis and therapeutic 
approach. If the therapy succeeds, we might ap-
plaud the psychiatrist for avoiding a knee-jerk 
resort to pharmaceuticals, and laud his brilliance 
in framing Colin’s suffering by invoking evolution-
ary psychology.
If the therapy fails, we might ask why psycho-
tropic medication was not offered as an option, in 
conjunction with the talk therapy. We might also 
question whether the source of the depression has 
been pinpointed. For example, was Colin’s shame 
about his non-combat duty the crux of the matter, 
or would a deeper examination reveal an underly-
ing survivor guilt in watching friends die without 
being put at personal risk? Or was the catalyst of 
his depression simply the huge letdown in return-
ing from exciting military service to the boredom 
of civilian life, perhaps to a job that has little 
challenge and a marriage that has lost its spark? 
Was invoking the African savannah an unhelpful 
digression? And was the psychiatrist counterpro-
ductively overidentifying with Colin as a white 
American man enthusiastic about the military 
arts, in need of more outlets for aggression, and 
worrying about his family’s safety?
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Second, assuming the therapy succeeds, 
why does it succeed? Is it because Colin’s brain 
chemistry is altered, which can occur through 
psychotherapy as well as pharmaceuticals? Or 
is it because of attitudes Colin develops dur-
ing therapy? More broadly, has the psychiatrist 
spotlighted a neglected syndrome and helped us 
understand how to understand and treat it? Does 
research into the syndrome warrant funding (a 
moral matter because the research might deflect 
research funds from other worthy projects). Is 
there any reason to think this is mainly a white-
male problem, or should we revisit Freud’s views 
about society and human aggression in Civiliza-
tion and Its Discontents (1930/1961), or instead 
invoke a feminist analysis about socially instilled 
ideals of masculinity?
Third, what is the role of truth in this very 
practical activity of healing? I share the now 
standard view that both brain chemistry and the 
patient’s sense of meaning are important in heal-
ing depression. I also believe that both should be 
wedded to the “common factors approach” to 
understanding therapeutic efficacy pioneered by 
Jerome and Julia Frank (1991, 40–44), among 
others. The Franks ask how hundreds of different 
therapies can be effective in dealing with depres-
sion and other ailments, at least for some patients. 
They answer that healing turns on a combination 
of generic factors such as an emotionally charged 
extended relationship between a suffering client 
and a caring therapist, a safe setting in which 
the client can open up emotionally, some sort of 
explanation (not necessarily true) of the client’s 
symptoms, and some type of procedure that the 
client and therapist think will help.
The common factors approach does not mean 
that a search for truth is replaced by just any 
subjectively meaningful encounter and perspec-
tive. But it does raise questions about the claims 
of insight therapies to cure by identifying “the” 
truth, as well as questions about how therapists 
sometimes distort truth as part of the healing 
process (Martin 2006, 163–166). Thus, evolution-
ary psychology might turn out to be irrelevant in 
explaining Colin’s depression but still make a heal-
ing contribution when invoked by this particular 
psychiatrist interacting with this particular veteran 
(in contrast, say, with a pacifist counselor interact-
ing with a biblical fundamentalist).
Fourth, and in conclusion, the case raises en-
during issues about how far psychotherapy is and 
should be value neutral (Sadler 2005; Tjeltveit 
1999). One issue is the extent to which thera-
pists should express their personal values during 
therapy. If Colin’s therapy succeeds, we have a case 
where the therapist’s active discussion of values, 
in particular concerning male masculinity and the 
martial arts, plays a positive role. If the therapy 
fails, we have a case where the therapist’s insertion 
of his values is inappropriate.
Another issue is how extensively psychotherapy 
is an inherently moral enterprise in which a caring 
and competent healer seeks to alleviate patients’ 
suffering and help clients to grapple with life’s 
challenges. These questions about therapeutic 
efficacy are not merely technical matters, but 
instead have moral dimensions. In addition, 
psychotherapy involves moral values in its proce-
dures, such as respect for clients’ autonomy and 
values, but also concern for third parties. With 
regard to third parties, the psychiatrist expresses 
worries that Colin’s preoccupation with proving 
himself might in some situation “unwittingly put 
himself and his family in harm’s way, if not hurt 
someone who was never really a threat to begin 
with.” This is good therapy: helping the patient 
while keeping in mind the moral claims of family 
and community—indeed, linking them.
Still another issue is the extent to which moral 
values shape the very definition of mental disorders 
and mental health. As a society, we have come to 
define virtually all forms of suffering that disrupt 
morally desirable functioning as pathological. 
Conservative social critics are deeply alarmed 
by this trend, and might even question whether 
Colin’s depression is sufficiently severe to be a 
psychiatric matter. Certainly there are grounds for 
caution about how far we have gone in medical-
izing depression, but I see wisdom in the trend, 
assuming we appreciate how morality and mental 
health are interwoven dimensions of both mental 
disorders and strengths (Martin 1999, 2006).
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